Has It Really Been That Long Ago?

Jordan over at Confined Space reminds us of last year’s disaster in Graniteville, South Carolina January 6, 2005, when a train transporting pressurized chlorine cylinders crashed into a parked train. According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) report released in November 2005, the train engineer and eight other people died as a result of chlorine gas inhalation. About 554 people complaining of respiratory difficulties were taken to local hospitals. Of these, 75 were admitted for treatment. Because of the chlorine release, about 5,400 people within a 1-mile radius of the derailment site were evacuated for several days.

The NTSB concluded that the probable cause of the accident was collision with a train parked on a siding. The crew of the parked train failed to return the switch to the main line after moving onto the siding. One of the chlorine cylinders was punctured, despite being constructed of normalized steel which is more resistant to catastrophic rupture.

The lessons learned from this episode have been coming out. In addition to the NTSB report, Steve Brittle, who runs the web site chemicalspill.org has provided a detailed list of the lessons learned from the emergency response, based on analysis of news reports and personal observations while in Graniteville. The synthesis of those documents has turned into a relatively long post, which is forthcoming. However, what I’ve found instructive from this tragic episode is this: one out of three chlorine tank cars was punctured during the accident; the tank did not empty completely – one third of its contents remained after the accident; and the accident occurred in a relatively thinly-settled area. Some might be reassured the impact from this incident wasn’t much worse; I wonder what might happen if something similar occurs somewhere more densely settled, and with a larger hazardous materials inventory. The NTSB report concluded "even the strongest tank cars in service can be punctured in accidents involving trains operating at moderate speeds."

NSTB reported that emergency response by the local authorities was “timely, appropriate and effective”, though first responders from the local fire department entered the crash site without first donning personal protective equipment, which, according to Mr. Brittle’s evaluation, degraded their response capabilities and produced injuries. Perhaps it was good that the response stayed local, and FEMA elected not to get involved (it wasn’t a natural disaster). The forthcoming House of Representatives report on disaster response from Hurricane Katrina is described as “blistering” by the Washington Post. Similarly, there is a perception that little has been done in the aftermath of the Graniteville accident to improve the safety of hazardous materials transportation. Local authorities everywhere should sit up and take note of this.